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Abstract
This paper studies whether trade integration between the EU15 and Cen-
tral Europe has led to more export specialization in Central Europe. Moreover,
we analyze the impact of institutional reforms in Central Europe on export
specialization. The empirical analysis is set up for thirteen Central European
countries over the period 1989-2000. Our results indicate that a reduction in
tari®s between EU15 and Central Europe led to increased export specialization
in Central Europe. In addition to trade integration, we show that institutional
reforms and in particular enterprise reforms contributed to export specializa-
tion.
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11 Introduction
Before 1989, trade amongst Central and Eastern European countries (CEECs) was
centrally planned and international trade openness was low. The fall of the Berlin
wall in 1989 led to the collapse of these arti¯cial trade relations amongst Central
and Eastern European countries. This event was the start of a long process during
which Central and East European countries had to adapt their economic, politi-
cal and institutional situation to the standards of a market economy. Trade °ows
rapidly re-orientated to the EU. As a consequence, the EU15 became the main trade
partner of Central and Eastern Europe. The process of trade integration between
Central and Eastern Europe and the EU15 during the nineties o®ers us a unique
opportunity to analyze the empirical relationship between trade integration and ex-
port specialization. In addition, the institutional changes in Central and Eastern
Europe allow us to study the impact of two types of institutional reforms on ex-
port specialization. Note that this paper is not a sectoral study, but will analyze
the e®ects of trade integration and institutional reforms on export specialization in
Central and Eastern Europe during the period 1989-2000.
Export specialization is an important issue because it makes countries more depen-
dent on a few industries and thus increases the risk of a sector-speci¯c shock (Koren
& Tenreyro 2004). Since 12 of the 13 Central and East European countries1 in
our sample became EU members in 2004 and 2007, their exposure to sector-speci¯c
shocks is of great interest to the EU15 as well. In addition to gradually declining
EU15 tari®s on Central and East European exports, we also take into account two
types of institutional reforms: enterprise reforms and competition policy reforms.
Enterprise reforms focus on credit and subsidy policies for ¯rms, while competition
policy reforms deal with market entry and market dominance. Both measures of
institutional reforms are an indication to what extent a country's policies and insti-
1Our sample consists of Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic, Slovenia, Slovakia, Malta, Cyprus,
Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Bulgaria, Romania and Turkey.
2tutions are restructured from planned-economy to market-economy based standards.
Both tari®s and institutions can a®ect a country's exports °ows. We observe that
the average export specialization in Central Europe is not a monotonic process. Our
Her¯ndhal index of export specialization increased sharply in the beginning of the
nineties. After 1992, average exports in Central Europe diversi¯ed, while from 1997
onwards export specialization increased again. The aim of this paper is to analyze
whether trade integration and institutional reforms can explain the pattern of ex-
port specialization that we observe in the data. Using a dynamic panel model, the
long- and short-run e®ects of changes in tari®s with the EU15 on changes in export
specialization in Central Europe can be disentangled. This is important because a
shock in tari®s cannot be expected to have the same immediate and long-run e®ect
on export specialization (Tre°er (2004) and Beine & Coulombe (2007)).
Our results indicate that trade integration with the EU15 increases export spe-
cialization in Central Europe only in the long-run. Institutional reforms stimulate
export specialization as well. The results show that enterprise reforms such as re-
structuring credit, subsidy and bankruptcy policies towards more market-economy
standards, increase the degree of export specialization signi¯cantly. An increase on
the performance of enterprise reforms of 1 unit, increases export specialization by
28%.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the related literature on the
relationship between trade integration, institutions and export specialization, while
section 3 shows some stylized facts. Section 4 explains the methodology and section
5 describes the data. Section 6 discusses the benchmark results and robustness
checks. Finally, section 8 discusses the results and section 9 brie°y concludes.
32 Related Literature
2.1 Trade Integration and Export Specialization
Traditional trade theories have shown that trade liberalization results in increasing
specialization in sectors where a country has a comparative advantage because of
di®erences in technology or factor endowments between countries. Also new trade
theories predict that countries specialize in sectors which are subject to economies of
scale. Trade liberalization decreases the number of varieties of goods in a country to
cut down on their average costs. According to the new economic geography theory,
when trade costs decrease, ¯rms will choose a location where they ¯nd a higher
demand for their products and where they ¯nd the largest pool of intermediate
good producers. Proximity to suppliers and consumers reduces trade costs and
may generate external economies of scale. As a consequence, regional specialization
increases when trade costs are reduced (Amiti (1999), De Bruyne (2004) and Baldwin
et al. (1999)).
The empirical literature provides evidence of increasing specialization in Western
Europe ((Amiti 1999), (Brulhart 1998)) and Central and Eastern Europe (Traistaru
et al. (2003) and Hildebrandt & WÄ orz (2004)). Traistaru et al. (2003) came to
the conclusion that trade integration leads to higher regional specialization in ¯ve
Eastern European countries2 during the period 1990-1999. Similarly, the study by
Hildebrandt & WÄ orz (2004) shows for 8 Central and Eastern European countries3
greater industrial specialization during the period 1993-2000. One drawback of these
studies is that usually trade integration is captured merely by a time trend assuming
that trade integration is a linear process. In contrast, Tre°er (2004) and Beine &
Coulombe (2007) measure trade integration by tari®s. Tre°er (2004) provides evi-
dence that a free trade agreement (FTA) between the US and Canada leads to trade
creation, increased labor productivity, but reduced employment for manufacturing
2Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary, Estonia and Slovenia
3Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovak Republic and Slovenia
4workers in Canada. Beine & Coulombe (2007) suggest that trade liberalization be-
tween Canadian regions and the US resulted in more regional export specialization
for Canada in the short-run, but less regional export specialization in the long-
run. The authors suggest that better access to suppliers and customers or positive
spillovers may trigger other industries to locate in the initially specialized region and
induce diversi¯cation of economic activities in the long-run. In contrast to Beine &
Coulombe (2007) and Tre°er (2004), this study tests the impact of trade integration
on 13 transition countries4 Based on trade theory, we expect a positive relation be-
tween trade integration and export specialization. But given the transition period
of the countries in the sample, we also need to take other elements into account as
possible determinants of export specialization such as institutional reforms. We will
discuss the relevant literature of this determinant in the next subsection.
2.2 Institutional Reforms and Export Specialization
In addition to the literature on trade integration, there is a growing literature on
the importance of institutions for various measures of economic performance. For
example, Acemoglu et al. (2005b) show that Western countries with better access
to the Atlantic ports have higher growth rates than Eastern European countries.
They observe that countries with stronger political institutions, property rights and
economic institutions traded more and spurred economic growth. In a more general
framework, Acemoglu et al. (2005a) explain that good economic institutions create
a stimulating environment for investors and producers. Increased investment leads
to economic growth and larger trade °ows. Therefore, institutions determine the
economic outcome of a country. Also, Dollar & Kraay (2003) ¯nd empirically that
trade and institutions have an impact on growth, but only in the long run.
With regard to trade, Jansen & Nordas (2004) provide empirical evidence that
countries with better institutions trade more. Moreover, Francois & Manchin (2007)
4Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic, Slovenia, Slovakia, Malta, Cyprus, Estonia, Latvia, Lithua-
nia, Bulgaria, Romania and Turkey
5show that the infrastructure and institutional quality in a country matter more
than decreasing tari®s in order to stimulate exports. This paper will study whether
institutional reforms, in addition to tari®s, have an impact on export specialization
in Central Europe. Therefore, we will use two measures of institutional reforms:
enterprise reforms and competition policy reforms which will be explained in more
detail in subsection 5.3.
3 Stylized Facts
In this section, we document the trends of the main variables from our regression
analysis in section 4.
3.1 Trade Integration
The centrally planned economy in Central and Eastern Europe imposed ¯xed prices,
quantity and quality and created a large shadow economy. Firms were stimulated
to maximize output and employment instead of pro¯ts and e±ciency. These incen-
tives needed to be changed by transition reforms such as liberalization and priva-
tization. The transition process started in 1989 and brought unexpected results.
Together with price liberalization and privatization, output and employment de-
creased, in°ation but also foreign direct investments increased (Roland 2000). In
the pre-transition period, a centrally institution de¯ned the bilateral trade relation-
ships between countries. Transition caused almost a total collapse of this trade.
Central and East European ¯rms needed to reorient trade and improve products
(Rodrik 1994), (Walsh & Whelan 2001). Figure 1 shows that in 1989 most countries
exported already intensively to Western Europe, but also Russia was an important
trade partner. In 2000 the export share to Europe increased sharply, while the share
of export to Russia decreased in all countries.
Not only did Central Europe direct its exports more towards the European Union,
but also the European Union allowed tari®s to decrease gradually during that period.
6Figure 1: The shift of exports to Europe, 1989-2000
Source: UN (1993, 1997, 2002)
7Figure 2 plots the average unweighed tari® of the EU15 on imports from Central
Europe over time. The average tari® started at an already relatively low level of
4.1% and declined gradually over the period 1989-2000 with two major drops in
1994 and 1997.
Figure 2: Trade liberalization of Central Europe with EU15 (%)
Source: Haveman data
By 1994 most countries5 had signed a Europe agreement with the EU15 which was
a bilateral agreement to decrease tari®s. These agreements might explain the ¯rst
large decrease in tari®s in 1994 as illustrated in Figure 2. The second large tari®
reduction was in 1997 and could be explained by the o±cial start of the enlargement
process in 1997-1998 when most Central European countries adopted the European
legislation. One of the chapters of this legislation deals with free movement of
goods and establishing a free trade area with the EU15. In May 2004, 10 countries
5Poland and Hungary were the ¯rst to sign the Europe agreement in 1991, the Czech Republic,
Bulgaria, Romania and Slovakia followed in 1993, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania signed their Europe
agreement in 1995 and ¯nally in 1996 Slovenia signed the Europe agreement. Turkey, Malta and
Cyprus signed the association agreement already in 1963, 1970 and 1972 respectively
8became a EU-member6, followed by Bulgaria and Romania in January 2007. As a
consequence, all remaining tari®s were abolished. Turkey applied for member ship,
but is not a EU member yet.
3.2 Institutional Reform
During the nineties, Central Europe made considerable reforms in institutions and
policies. We use data on two measures for institutional reforms, namely enter-
prise reforms and competition policy reforms, to verify to what extent institutional
reforms in addition to trade integration matter for export specialization. These
variables, collected from the EBRD reports, report to what extent these countries
restructured their policies and institutions from plan-economy to market-economy
based standards. The upper graph of Figure 3 suggests that during the period of
our analysis, both types of institutional reforms have a clear positive trend. A sec-
ond observation is that for the whole period, enterprise reforms were stronger than
competition policy reforms and in addition the enterprise reforms series show more
variation than the competition policy reforms series. During these eleven years,
Central European countries improved from score 2 to almost score 3 on both in-
stitutional reforms. Since institutional reforms are only available for Central and
Eastern European countries, a direct comparison with EU15 scores is not possible.
In order to have some benchmark for these scores, we can compare the countries
among each other according to their degree of development. The lower graph of
Figure 3 illustrates that the more developed countries in our sample 7 also have
higher scores on both institutional reforms indicators. Especially in the beginning
of the period, the gap between countries with a high GDP per capita and countries
with a low GDP per capita8 is large. But from 1992 onwards, reforms in the less
6Cyprus, Malta, Slovakia, Slovenia, Poland, Czech Republic, Hungary, Estonia, Latvia and
Lithuania
7Countries with a GDP per capita above average: Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovenia.
8Countries with a GDP per capita below average: Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland,
Romania, Slovakia.
9Figure 3: Average institutional reforms in Central Europe, 1989-2000
Source: EBRD reports, Note: Countries with a GDP per capita above average = Czech Republic,
Hungary and Slovenia. Countries with a GDP per capita below average = Bulgaria, Estonia,
Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia.
10developed countries catch up rapidly, while reforms in the more developed countries
remain stable. The measures of institutional reforms will be explained in more detail
in subsection 5.3.
3.3 Export Specialization
Figure 4: Average export specialization in Central Europe
Source: Eurostat
In Figure 4 we show the evolution of the average export specialization for 13 Central
European countries during the period 1989-2000. We measure export specialization
by an Her¯ndahl index on exports which will be explained in more detail in sub-
section 5.1. The index lies between 0 and 1 and the interpretation is as follows: a
higher value of the index refers to more export specialization, whereas a Her¯ndahl
index closer to zero suggests more export diversi¯cation. Figure 4 seems to indicate
that export specialization in Central Europe is not a monotonic process. The ¯gure
illustrates that in the early nineties average export specialization increased sharply,
probably because countries redirected their exports after transition. After 1992,
export specialization decreased which could indicate that Central Europe started
11exporting in more and new sectors. While after 1997, export specialization has
increased again, suggesting that the number of sectors the countries are exporting
in, went down. This U-shape is also what Imbs & Wacziarg (2003) and Koren &
Tenreyro (2004) found for other countries: sectoral concentration is a function of
the level of per capita income. Poor countries tend to diversify to reduce the risk of
a sector speci¯c shock, when they grow to higher levels of per capita income they
specialize again, but never as high as their initial specialization level. Note that a
similar value of the export specialization index at di®erent moments in time may
hide a di®erent sector specialization. It might be that the export mix has changed
over time. We will add a short discussion on this in section 8.
Note also that ¯gure 4 illustrates the average export specialization for all 13 coun-
tries. Nevertheless, there are di®erences across countries. The individual evolution
of the countries' export specialization is illustrated in Appendix 10.1. From these
¯gures we observe that export specialization increased in the most recent years,
except for Slovenia, Lithuania, Malta and Romania since they already had a high
initial level of export specialization.
4 Methodology
In order to investigate the relationship between trade integration, institutions and
export specialization, we build on the approach proposed by Beine & Coulombe
(2007) which relies on the estimation of a dynamic panel model derived from an error
correction model (See appendix 10.3, Vogelvang (2005)). The estimation model is
as follows
¢log(Exp spec:i;t) = ®i + ±t + Á1log(Exp spec:i;t¡1) + Á2¢log(tariffEU15i;t) (1)
+Á3log(tariffEU15i;t¡1) + Á4Ii;t + Á0
5Zi;t + ²i;t (2)
where i is a Central or Eastern European country in a certain year t. Exp spec:i;t is
12the level of export specialization measured by a Her¯ndahl index based on annual
sectoral trade °ows from country i to the EU15. TariffEU15i;t is the EU15-tari® on
imports from a Central and Eastern European country i. This measure is based on
sectoral tari®s, weighted with the export structure of country i and aggregated to
the country level. Ii;t captures the level of a country's institutional reforms and Zi;t
is a vector of other control variables such as the business cycle of country i. Country
¯xed e®ects, ®i, control for unobserved country-speci¯c e®ects, time dummies, ±t,
take into account a common shock and ²i;t is the error term. The de¯nition of the
variables will be clari¯ed in more detail in section 5. This model is estimated with
OLS9 and Newey-West robust standard errors to take into account serial correlation
and heteroscedasticity.
The dynamic nature of the model is important because it disentangles the short-
run from the long-run e®ects of trade integration. The short-run is captured by
Á3 while the long run is given by ¡
Á2
Á1. The decomposition of the e®ect of trade
integration between a short- and a long-run component is important since a shock
in tari®s will lead to short-run adjustment costs (displaced workers, closed plants),
while in the long-run, trade liberalization will lead to e±ciency gains (stakeholders
of competitive plants and users of ¯nal and intermediate goods) (Tre°er, 2004). The
derivation of the short- and long-run e®ect of this model is explained in Appendix
10.3.
5 Data
We analyze export specialization (Exp spec.) in Central Europe as a function of
trade weighted tari®s (tari®), institutional reforms (I) and other control variables
(Z) such as the business cycles. This section gives an overview of the data and
variables.
9GMM will be used as a robustness check. However, since the time series are short, the number
of instruments are limited to two lags.
135.1 Export Specialization
A common measure for export specialization in the literature is the Her¯ndahl index
on exports (Sapir 1996)10. The evolution of the Her¯ndahl index of export special-
ization might reveal to what extent a given country is becoming more specialized or
diversi¯ed, regardless of how the economic structures of other countries are evolving.
A recent study has shown that export specialization is a good proxy for industrial
specialization (Laurin 2007).
The Her¯ndahl index is computed for each country i and each year t as the sum of













A higher index indicates that country i exports in a smaller range of sectors and
hence is more specialized. To construct the Her¯ndahl indices, yearly export °ows
from 13 individual countries of Central and Eastern Europe to the EU15 on the 8-
digit HS classi¯cation11 product level were collected from Eurostat12for the period
1989-200013. Using a correspondence key, the data was translated to the 4-digit
NACE industry level14 (250 sectors) to calculate the industry export shares.
10We investigate here the degree of the so-called absolute specialization, i.e. the extent to what
a given country or region is specialized in a limited number of activities. This concept of special-
ization directly relates to the concept of risk exposure. This contrasts with relative specialization
which measures to what extent the export or production structure di®ers from those of the other
(contingent) countries or regions.
11The Harmonized system (HS) is a classi¯cation system we use at the 8-digit product level and
note that we collected trade data for all sectors, not only the manufacturing sector
12The Eurostat trade statistics is a high quality database containing annual data on trade °ows
to and from European countries.
13For Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Slovenia data was only available from 1992 onwards and for
Slovakia from 1993 onwards.
14NACE is a European classi¯cation system.
145.2 Trade Integration
Most previous studies on trade integration use time dummies to capture trade in-
tegration and thereby implicitly assume that trade integration is linear over time.
From Figure 4 we know that trade integration is not linear, therefore we rather
use tari®s to measure trade integration as in Beine & Coulombe (2007) and Tre°er
(2004). Yearly EU15-tari®s15 on the HS 8-digit product level are collected from the
Haveman database. These data are available from 1989 until 2000. Since not all
tari®s were available for all years16, we replaced the missing tari® at time t with the
tari® value at t + 117.
The sectoral EU15-tari®s ¿k on exports from Central and Eastern European coun-
tries are aggregated to the country level using the industry export shares of the















Note that we study only trade °ows to and tari®s from the EU15. Since the EU15 is
the main trading partner of the Central and East European countries as illustrated
in Figure 1, EU15-tari®s will have the largest e®ect on export specialization in
Central Europe and tari®s of the rest of the world will not play a major role in our
results.
To test the robustness of this trade weighted tari®, regressions with di®erent weights
and two alternative measures for tari®s will be used in the estimations in section 6.
15 Only the preferential rates on export products from an individual Central and Eastern Eu-
ropean country was used, but when this rate was not available, we used the MFN (most favored
nations) rates.
16Only the years 1996, 1998, 1999 and 2000 were available for most products.
17To test the impact of this manipulation, we ran estimations where we replaced the missing
tari® at time t with the tari® value of time t ¡ 1. The results did not change
155.3 Institutional reforms
The transition process also implied a drastic institutional change in Central Europe.
Institutions were reformed towards more market economy standards. We will use
two indicators of institutional reforms: enterprise reforms and competition policy
reforms from the EBRD18. These transition indicators re°ect the judgment of the
EBRD about country-speci¯c progress in enterprise and competition policy reforms.
EBRD country specialists propose a score for a particular country which is then
discussed at length by an internal committee within the EBRD. Each country gets
a score between 1 and 4.3319 where 1 represents an institution with little or no
change from a centrally planned market and 4.33 indicates that the standards of
an industrialized market economy are implemented in the institutional environment
of the country. To assign these scores, the EBRD follows certain criteria for each
institution based on the following classi¯cation system in Table 1.
The indicator of enterprise reforms reports to what extent the countries reduced
production subsidies and introduced e®ective bankruptcy procedures to be more
in line with market-economy standards. A country has a score of 1 if there is no
¯nancial discipline at the enterprise level, this means that ine±cient ¯rms receive
generous state subsidies to continue production. When e®ective bankruptcy proce-
dures exist and credits are given to the most e±cient ¯rms, the country will receive
a score of 4.33. The competition policy reforms indicator concentrates on facilitat-
ing market entry and combating the abuse of market dominance by monopolies. A
score of 1 indicates that there is no competition legislation, a few dominant ¯rms
control the market and market entry is restricted. When a country achieves e®ec-
tive enforcement of competition policy, meaning unrestricted entry to the market
and punishment of abuse of market power, a score of 4.33 is given. A disadvantage
of these indicators is that for some countries the variable does not vary much over
18EBRD is the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development
19The scores increment with 0.33, this means that the scale between, say 2 and 3, would have
the following components: 2;2.33;2.66 and 3
16Table 1: Institutional reforms
score enterprise reforms
1 if there are soft budget constraints (lax credit and subsidy policies weakening
¯nancial discipline at the enterprise level) and few other reforms are made
to promote corporate governance.
2 if there is a moderately tight credit and subsidy policy, but weak enforcement
of bankruptcy legislation and little action taken to strengthen competition
and corporate governance.
3 if signi¯cant and sustained actions are taken to harden budget constraints (tight credit
and subsidy policy) and to promote corporate governance e®ectively.
4 if substantial improvement is made in corporate governance
and signi¯cant new investment at the enterprise level.
4.33 if there are standards and performance typical of advanced industrial economies:
e®ective corporate control exercised through domestic ¯nancial institutions
and markets, fostering market-driven restructuring.
score competition policy reforms
1 if there are no competition legislation and institutions.
2 if competition legislation and institutions are set up and there is some
reduction of entry restrictions or enforcement action on dominant ¯rms.
3 if some enforcement actions are taken to reduce abuse of market power
and to promote a competitive environment.
4 if signi¯cant enforcement actions are taken to reduce abuse of market power
and to promote a competitive environment.
4.33 if there are standards and performance norms typical of advanced industrial economies:
e®ective enforcement of competition policy; unrestricted entry to most markets.
Source: EBRD reports
Note: the EBRD indicators are not available for Malta, Cyprus and Turkey.
17time. A detailed table on this data is reported in Appendix 10.2.
A ¯nal remark should be made on corruption. According to Dixit (2004), de¯cien-
cies of the law are especially present in less developed countries and in transition
countries. The collapse of a strict communist system and the transition to a market
economy left some areas open for groups to provide alternative institutions and eco-
nomic rules. Therefore, it is important to what extent these institutional variables
take into account corruption. A corruption index is collected from `transparency in-
ternational network'. This index assesses the level at which corruption is perceived
by businessman as impacting on commercial life. The index is based on several sur-
veys in a list of countries and lies between 0 and 10. A score of 10 equals an entirely
clean country, while 0 equals a country where business transactions are entirely dom-
inated by extortion. In other words, a higher index equals less corruption perceived
by businessmen in that country. Figure 5 illustrates that this corruption index is
positively correlated with enterprise reforms. A country with more advanced enter-
prise reforms has also less corruption. This suggests that the level of corruption is
possibly already taken into account in the institutional reforms measure.
Figure 5: Correlation enterprise reforms and corruption in Central Europe
185.4 Other control Variables
This subsection describes four other control variables that might also a®ect export
specialization in Central Europe. First, to control for business cycles in individual
Central and East European countries and the EU15, GDP data (EBRD reports,
IMF database) are decomposed in a growth trend and a cyclical component, the
business cycle, with the Hodrick-Prescott ¯lter.20
Second, the economic freedom index reports an index for hidden import barriers
(HIB) other than published tari®s and quotas21. Since correlation between the hid-
den import barriers index and our variable for trade weighted tari®s is low (correla-
tion = 0.0136), this variable can be included complementary to the tari® variable.
This will allow us to control for other tari®s, non-tari® barriers or quotas that are
not captured by the tari® variable.
Final, two alternatives for the tari® variable will be used to measure trade integra-
tion with the EU15. An indicator of trade liberalization from the EBRD data will
indicate to what extent there are no import or export restrictions. The indicator of
price liberalization from the EBRD data will show to what extent there are no price
restrictions in the country.
6 Results
Table 2 reports the main estimation results of equation (1). Column (1) shows the
results of a regression with tari®s, control variables for the business cycle, coun-
try and time ¯xed e®ects. Since the year dummies are not signi¯cant and do not
20Maravall & del Rio (2001) and Pedersen (2001) suggest that the smoothing parameter of the
¯lter should be between 6 and 14 for annual data. Higher values produce smoother results. In this
analysis, we will use a value of 7 for the smoothing parameter. Results with a smooth value of 14
are not reported here, but are similar.
21HIB is only available for the years 1990, 1995 and 2000 on a country-level
19change the result, they will not be included anymore in the following regressions22.
Regressions (2) and (3) report the institutional reforms variables, enterprise reforms
and competition policy reforms, separately23 and reduce the analysis to 10 coun-
tries since the institutional reforms variables are not available for Malta, Cyprus
and Turkey. According to Acemoglu et al. (2005a) institutions in°uence a country's
economic performance, but economic performance will change the political power of
groups in a society and thus change institutions. Therefore, institutions can be en-
dogenous. The regression in column (4) instruments the variable enterprise reforms
variables with its lag to control for possible endogeneity.
We ¯nd very robust results in favor of a long-run relationship between trade integra-
tion and export specialization (¡Á2=Á1)24. The long-run relationship is negative,
based at column (2) in Table 2, a 1% decrease in EU15-tari®s increases export
specialization in Central Europe by 1.3%25. This result supports trade theories sug-
gesting that trade integration leads to a long-run concentration of activities across
regions and across sectors. In the short-run, trade integration has no signi¯cant
in°uence on export specialization (coe±cient Á3 is not signi¯cant). The lagged
dependent variable, log(export specializationt¡1), is negative signi¯cant suggesting
that there is persistence and that the annual export specialization is decreasing.
This is also what we observed in Figure 4.
Regarding the institutional reforms, the estimation results of Table 2 indicate that
enterprise reforms have a positive and signi¯cant e®ect on export specialization.
This implies that an increase of one unit in enterprise reforms, leads to an increase
of 28% in export specialization. In contrast, competition policy reforms have no
22This is important because it suggests that our results are not driven by time trends common
to all countries.
23The correlation (0.72) between the enterprise reforms and competition policy reforms variables
is too high to include these variables in 1 regression.
24Using a Wald test, the ratio (¡Á2=Á1) is signi¯cantly di®erent from zero (p-value = 0.0006).
25Estimations with more lags of the tari® and export specialization variables did not change
results and were not signi¯cant. Therefore, these estimations are not reported here.
20Table 2: Impact on export specialization for Central Europe
(1) (2) (3) (4) IV
Constant -1.4*** -0.74* -1.02* -0.7
(0.47) (0.44) (0.55) (0.45)
log(Exp spec:i;t¡1) -0.41*** -0.44*** -0.39*** -0.41***
(0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.09)
log(tariffi;t¡1) -0.49*** -0.58** -0.23 -0.28
(0.15) (0.28) (0.25) (0.29)
¢log(tariffi;t) -0.21* -0.13 -0.14 -0.15
(0.12) (0.11) (0.10) (0.15)
nat. business cycleit 1.47e-06 6.17e-07 -8.21e-07 9.26e-07
(1.74e-06) (1.38e-06) (1.80e-06) (2.24e-06)
EU business cycleit 0.001*** -0.0001 -.0001 -0.0002
(.0006) (0.0005) (.0005) (0.001)
enterprise reformsit - 0.28*** - 0.04
(0.10) (0.17)
competition policyit - - 0.15 -
(0.09)
time dummies yes - - -
country ¯xed e®ects yes yes yes yes
obs 121 91 91 91
p value(F ¡ stat) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.004
R2 0.40 0.4 0.35 0.22
Robust standard errors of estimates are in parentheses. All models include country ¯xed e®ects
and time dummies are only included in column (1). Column (2), (3) and (4) only take into account
10 countries since data on institutional reforms was not available for Malta, Cyprus and Turkey.
In column (4) enterprise reform is instrumented using its lagged value. note:***, ** and * denote
signi¯cance level of estimates at respectively 1, 5 and 10 percent levels.
21signi¯cant e®ect on export specialization. A possible explanation is that compe-
tition policy can in°uence the volume of trade or exports, but does not in°uence
export specialization in itself. Moreover, stricter credit policies implies that the
least e±cient ¯rms will exit the market and only ¯rms in the most productive sec-
tors will survive. So that export will be concentrated in sectors with a comparative
advantage. The last column of Table 2 lags enterprise reforms with one period to
overcome possible endogeneity. The coe±cient of enterprise reforms is still positive,
but not signi¯cant. This might indicate that there is only a simultaneous e®ect of
institutions and no lagged e®ect.
Compared to prior research, our study con¯rms the result of increasing specializa-
tion in Central Europe of previous studies using time dummies to measure trade
integration (Hildebrandt & WÄ orz (2004) and Traistaru et al. (2003)). Moreover, we
extend their result to 13 countries in Central Europe and identify the main drivers
behind export specialization: trade integration and enterprise reforms. A possi-
ble explanation why we ¯nd the opposite result of Beine & Coulombe (2007) for
Canada is the di®erence in the level of development of the sample countries (Imbs
& Wacziarg (2003), Koren & Tenreyro (2004)).
7 Robustness checks
In order to assess the robustness of our regression results in Table 2, this section
will report some extended analyses.
The regressions in columns (1) and (2) in Table 3 deal with possible econometric
problems. First, since the weights of the tari® variable could be endogenously cor-
related with the Her¯ndahl index of exports, regression (1) uses constant weights
(average export share over the period 1989-2000) in the tari® variable. The disad-
vantage of this constant weight is the loss of variation over time. Therefore, column
(2) uses the weight of the tari® variable lagged by 1 period. We also need to consider
the possibility of non-linearities in export specialization. From Figure 4 we know
22that export specialization does not follow a monotonic pattern. Therefore, column
(3) controls for a non-linear relationship between tari®s and export specialization.
Since corruption was especially a big problem during transition in Central Europe,
column (4) explicitly controls for corruption. Finally, regression (5) includes a mea-
sure for non published import tari®s and quotas (HIB).
The long-run e®ect of tari®s on export specialization still holds in columns (1) to (3).
Moreover, in column (3) a non-linear e®ect of tari®s is positive, but not signi¯cant. A
positive non-linear e®ect would imply that a small decrease in tari®s at higher tari®
levels, decreases export specialization. This could be the case for prohibitive tari®s.
A decrease in a prohibitive tari® will lead to more ¯rms exporting in di®erent sectors
and thus induce export diversi¯cation. In our sample, the maximum unweighted
import tari® is only 5.96% and not prohibitive.
Another robustness check explicitly controls for corruption. The estimation in col-
umn (4) shows that the corruption index is not signi¯cant. Finally, controlling for
other tari®s (HIB) is not signi¯cant and does not change previous results, the es-
timation in column (5) implies that the tari® variable captures most of the trade
integration process between Central and Eastern Europe and the EU1526.
Table 4 reports a second set of robustness checks. First, the sample is reduced to the
period 1994-2000 in column (1). This robustness check excludes in°uences from a
possible prohibitive tari® in the beginning of transition and the heavily restructuring
period in the ¯rst years of transition. In Column (2), the sample excludes the
countries Turkey, Bulgaria and Romania who have a di®erent EU-accession path
compared to the other countries. The results in Table 4 show that the long-run
e®ect of tari®s on export specialization holds in both cases.
Finally, Table 4 veri¯es whether our results are robust to di®erent measures of trade
integration and export specialization. In column (3) and (4), the tari® variable
is replaced by an index of trade liberalization and an index of price liberalization
26Other authors tried to proxy non-tari® barriers by a frequency index but failed to ¯nd a
signi¯cant in°uence on trade (Amiti & Konings (2007) and Mayer & Zignago (2005)).
23Table 3: Impact on export specialization for Central Europe
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Constant -0.84* -0.4 -1.09*** -0.53 -0.96
(0.51) (0.64) (0.44) (0.52) (6.65)
log(Exp spec:i;t¡1) -0.35*** -0.56*** -0.43*** -0.40*** -0.45***
(0.07) (0.1) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08)
log(tariffi;t¡1) -0.41*** -0.84*** -0.58*** -0.12 -0.54***
(0.16) (0.33) (0.16) (0.26) (0.16)
¢log(tariffi;t) 0.13 -0.04 -0.42* -0.11 -0.18
(0.18) (0.08) (0.23) (0.08) (0.12)
nat. business cycleit -1.64e-07 4.12e-06 1.78e-06 9e-07 1.72e-06
(1.31e-06) (2.80e-06) (1.66e-06) (1.39e-06) (1.90e-06)
EU business cycleit .0006 -0.0003 0.001** -0.0003 0.001
(.0005) (0.0004) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.001)
¢log(tariff2
i;t) - - 0.23 -
(0.17)
corruptionit - - - -0.09
(0.07)
HIBit - - - - -0.04
(0.87)
country ¯xed e®ects yes yes yes yes yes
obs 121 81 121 90 114
p value(F ¡ stat) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
R2 0.58 0.46 0.38 0.41 0.38
Robust standard errors of estimates are in parentheses. All models include country ¯xed e®ects. In
column (1) the regression uses constant export shares as weights for the tari® variable and in column
(2) the weights of the tari® variable are lagged by one period. Column (3) takes into account a
non linear e®ect of tari®s on export specialization. A variable to control for corruption or for other
barriers (HIB) is included in column (4) and (5) respectively. note:***, ** and * denote signi¯cance
level of estimates at respectively 1, 5 and 10 percent levels.
24respectively, both variables show up positive and signi¯cant in the regressions. This
con¯rms that more trade or price liberalization leads to more export specialization
in Central Europe.
8 Discussion of results
A recent study by Francois & Manchin (2007) examines the role of institutions,
infrastructure and tari®s in explaining why some countries trade and others do not.
The authors show that basic infrastructure (communications and transport) and
institutional quality matter more for exports than tari®s. Our results showed that a
decrease in EU15 tari®s by 1% induces an increase in export specialization by 1.3%,
while an increase of one unit of enterprise reforms leads to an increase in export
specialization by 28%. A wald test could not counter the null hypothesis that the
coe±cient of the long-run e®ect of tari®s and the coe±cient of enterprise reforms
are equal. This suggests that both tari®s and enterprise reforms play an important
role in stimulating export specialization in Central and Eastern Europe although
the tari® e®ect is more robust.
A second discussion we would like to mention here refers to Figure 4 in section 3.
This ¯gure illustrated the average export specialization in Central Europe. Since this
does not show us in which sectors Central Europe is specialized in, we will study this
in more detail here. First, we would like to analyze how much of the specialization
in 2000 is associated with a change in the composition of total exports. Therefore
we follow Hoekman & Djankov (1997) who measure the change in the composition
of exports by calculating the simple correlation between RCAs27 for each country
in 1990 and 1995. A higher correlation indicates that less change has occurred.










where xij are exports in sector i by country j, Xj are country j's total exports, N is the number of
countries
25Table 4: Robustness check
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Constant -1.56** -0.98** -1.17*** -1.18***
(0.67) (0.5) (0.42) (0.37)
log(Exp spec:i;t¡1) -0.47*** -0.45*** -0.36*** -0.38***
(0.1) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09)
log(tariffi;t¡1) -0.55** -0.63*** -
(0.26) (0.17)
¢log(tariffi;t) -0.19* -0.21* - -
(0.11) (0.13)
nat. bus. cycleit -9.64e-07 5.25e-06*** 5.36e-07 7.99e-07
(2.19e-06) (1.69e-06) (1.29e-06) (1.28e-06)
EU bus. cycleit 0.002* 0.002*** -0.0004 -0.0005
(0.0008) (0.001) (0.0004) (0.0004)
trade liberal.it - - 0.09* -
(0.05)
price liberal.it - - - 0.12***
(0.05)
country f. e. yes yes yes yes
obs 87 88 91 91
p value(F ¡ stat) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
R2 0.41 0.41 0.58 0.37
Robust standard errors of estimates are in parentheses. Column (1) does not include
the years 1989-1993, while column (2) uses only the EU10 (not Turkey, Bulgaria
and Romania). Regressions in column (3) and (4) replace the tari® variable by an
indicator of trade and price liberalization respectively. note: ***, ** and * denote
signi¯cance level of estimates at respectively 1, 5 and 10 percent levels.
26Hoekman & Djankov (1997) observe little change in the composition of exports.
Most countries of Central Europe exported in the same sectors in 1995 as in 1990.
We will extend their analysis with our export data from 1989 until 2000 for 13
countries. The correlations between the RCAs for each country in 1989 and 2000
are reported in Table 5. We observe that the correlations are remarkably lower
than in Hoekman & Djankov (1997) which might be indicative of a change in the
composition of exports of Central Europe in 2000. Second, to gain insight in which
sectors the Central European countries are specialized, Figures 6 to 8 compare the
export share in the manufacturing, agriculture and mining sector for each country
in 1989 and 2000. The ¯gures show that all countries except Latvia28 increased
their export share in the manufacturing sector at the expense of exports in the
agriculture and mining sector. Within the manufacturing sector especially exports
in the transport, metals, electrical and textiles sector increased sharply (See ¯gures
in Appendix 10.4 for an overview per country). According to Sinn (2006) more and
more Western European ¯rms have their products prefabricated abroad. By setting
up their own manufacturing plants in Eastern Europe (o®shoring), they make use
of the low wages in this region. While labor intensive upstream activities are shifted
abroad, the downstream stages of production remain in Western Europe and are
even expanded. A ¯rst glance on one of the expanding sectors in Central Europe,
the textiles sector, shows us that indeed Central Europe is mainly exporting in labor-
intensive sectors as preparation of textile ¯bres, textile weaving and manufacturing
of knitted pullovers.
28Latvia increased its export share sharply in the agricultural sector.
27Table 5: Change in the composition of exports, 1989-2000
Bulgaria Cyprus Czech Rep. Estonia Latvia
Hoekman & Djankov (1997) 0.41 0.58
Our results 0.4 0.65 0.52 0.49 0.34
Malta Hungary Poland Romania Slovakia
Hoekman & Djankov (1997) 0.89 0.80 0.32 0.68
Our results 0.55 0.43 0.55 0.33 0.11
Lithuania Slovenia Turkey
Hoekman & Djankov (1997)
Our results 0.22 0.63 0.71
Figure 6: Average export share in manufacturing sector in Central Europe
28Figure 7: Average export share in agriculture sector in Central Europe
Figure 8: Average export share in mining sector in Central Europe
299 Conclusion
This paper analyzed whether the trade integration process between the EU15 and
Central Europe has led to more export specialization in Central Europe. Moreover,
we studied whether institutional reforms in Central Europe in°uenced export spe-
cialization. During the period 1989-2000, we observed a gradual decline in EU15
tari®s on exports from Central and Eastern European countries. In addition, in-
stitutional reforms in these countries increased rapidly as a result of the transition
process from a centrally planned to a market economy. We focused on two types of
institutional reforms: enterprise reforms and competition policy reforms. Both vari-
ables indicate to what extent Central Europe restructured its institutions to more
market economy standards. Enterprise reforms include credit and subsidy policies
for ¯rms, while competition policy reforms consist of abolishing entry restrictions
and dominant market power. On average, the 13 Central and East European coun-
tries in our sample performed better on enterprise reforms than on competition
policy reforms. The impact of EU15 tari®s and institutional reforms on export
specialization in Central Europe was analyzed using a dynamic panel model. This
model enables us to disentangle between a short run and a long run e®ect of tar-
i®s. The results indicate a positive e®ect of tari®s on export specialization in the
long run. A 1% decrease in EU15-tari®s increases export specialization in Central
Europe by 1.3%. Furthermore, an increase of enterprise reforms by one unit leads
to an increase of about 28% in export specialization. Our ¯ndings are suggestive
that both trade integration with the EU15 as enterprise reforms stimulate export
specialization in Central and Eastern Europe.
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3310 appendices
10.1 Average export specialization per country
The following graphs report the export specialization measured by the Her¯ndahl
index per country over time, 1989-2000.
343510.2 Institutional reforms indicators
As an alternative to the tari® variable, two EBRD indicators on trade and price
liberalization are used. These indicators lie between 1 and 4.33 according to their
achievement in reforms. The classi¯cation system for the trade liberalization and
price liberalization reforms are as follows:
36Table A: Trade liberalization
score Trade liberalization reforms
1 if there are widespread import and/or export controls or very limited legitimate
access to foreign exchange.
2 if there is some liberalization of import and/or export controls; almost full current
account convertibility in principle, but with a foreign exchange regime that is not
fully transparent (possibly with multiple exchange rates).
3 if almost all quantitative and administrative import and export restrictions
are removed and there is almost full current account convertibility.
4 if all quantitative and administrative import and export restrictions are removed
(apart from agriculture) and all signi¯cant export tari®s; insigni¯cant direct
involvement in exports and imports by ministries and state-owned trading companies;
no major non-uniformity of customs duties for non-agricultural goods and services;
full and current account convertibility.
4.33 if there are standards and performance norms of advanced industrial economies:
removal of most tari® barriers; membership in WTO.
Table B: Price liberalization
score Price liberalization reforms
1 if most prices are formally controlled by the government.
2 if there is some lifting of price administration; state procurement at non-market
prices for the majority of product categories.
3 if signi¯cant progress has been made on price liberalization, but state procurement
at non-market prices remains substantial.
4 if there is comprehensive price liberalization; state procurement at non-market
prices largely phased out; only a small number of administered prices remain.
Source: EBRD; Note: EBRD indicators are not available for Malta, Cyprus and Turkey.
37Table C: Enterprise and competition policy reforms data
Bulgaria Czech Republic Estonia
year competition enterprise competition enterprise competition enterprise
1989 2 1 3 3 1 1
1990 2 1 3 3 1 1
1991 2 1 3 3 1 1
1992 2 1 3 3 1 2
1993 2 1 3 3 2 3
1994 2 2 3 3 2 3
1995 2 2 3 3 2 3
1996 2 2 3 3 2 3
1997 2.3 2.3 3 3 2 3
1998 2.3 2.3 3 3 2 3
1999 2.3 2.3 3 3 2.7 3
2000 2.3 2.3 3 3.3 2.7 3
Hungary Latvia Lithuania
year competition enterprise competition enterprise competition enterprise
1989 3 3 1 1 1 1
1990 3 3 1 1 1 1
1991 3 3 1 1 1 1
1992 3 3 2 2 1 1
1993 3 3 2 2 2 2
1994 3 3 2 2 2 2
1995 3 3 2 2 2 2
1996 3 3 2 3 2 2
1997 3 3 2.3 2.7 2.3 2.3
1998 3 3.3 2.3 2.7 2.3 2.7
1999 3 3.3 2.3 2.7 2.3 2.7
2000 3 3.3 2.3 2.7 2.7 2.7
38Poland Romania Slovenia
year competition enterprise competition enterprise competition enterprise
1989 3 3 1 1 2 3
1990 3 3 1 1 2 3
1991 3 3 1 1 2 3
1992 3 3 1 1 2 3
1993 3 3 1 2 2 3
1994 3 3 1 2 2 3
1995 3 3 1 2 2 3
1996 3 3 1 2 2 3
1997 3 3 2.3 2 2 2.7
1998 3 3 2.3 2 2.3 2.7
1999 3 3 2.3 2 2.3 2.7







































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































4010.3 Error correction model
Methodology:
Equation 1 is an error correction model without explicitly including an error cor-
rection term in the form of
4yt = ® + '1yt¡1 + '2Xt¡1 + '3¢Xt + ²t (6)
This model can be rewritten in an error correction form as follows:
4yt = ® + '1[yt¡1 ¡ (
¡'2
'1
)Xt¡1] + '3¢Xt (7)
'1 can be interpreted as the speed at which export specialization adjusts to any
di®erence between export specialization and tari®s in the previous period. The
short-run e®ect, the immediate e®ect that tari®s have on export specialization, is
represented by '3. The causal e®ect that occurs over future periods, long-run e®ect
is re°ected by ¡
'2
'1.
4110.4 Export shares by industry per country
These graphs illustrate the export share by industry in 1989 and 2000 for each 13
countries separately.
4243444546Figure A: Export shares per country within manufacturing
47